The Cost of Being a Girl

By Yasemin Besen-Cassino

Molly has been working as a babysitter for some time. She has been doing a great job and you hear nothing but good things about Molly from your child. After working for you for six months, she asks for a raise. What happens when she asks for a raise? Would you give her more money? What would she need to do to deserve the raise?

These are some of the questions I discuss in my new book, Cost of Being a Girl: Working Teens and the Origins of the Gender Wage Gap.



“Pricing the Priceless Child (care)”

Taking care of children is a very important job, also one that is physically demanding and challenging, yet the pay does not reflect the emotional importance or the degree difficulty. The National Average for babysitters is $15.20 an hour.

In an experiment I designed, I present participants with vignettes of Molly and Jake, a female and male babysitter (yes they exist and are a new trend especially for babysitting boys) who work for you for some time and your child is very happy with. What happens when they ask for a raise when you can afford it? Who is more likely to get the raise? Even when they go over and beyond to show that they care about the child and show emotional attachment?

When Molly asks for a raise, she is less likely to get the raise. When she does not show an emotional connection to the child, she is cold and unlikeable. When she does show care, she is accused of being manipulative. When she is detached and does not care, she is not seen as loving and nurturing. When she is caring and nurturing, these traits are seen in conflict with monetary gain, so asking for money after showing care makes her manipulative and unlikable. Either way, Molly suffers in the workplace.

Informal Ties help find jobs, but also make girls less likely to ask for a raise or leave

Based on my in-depth interviews with babysitters, I find that many girls get into babysitting because it is available and accessible especially for younger teens and tweens. While personal networks are instrumental in getting babysitting jobs, many babysitters stay much longer, months and years longer than they intended because of their informal networks. These weak ties also make it more difficult for girls to ask for a raise. Overall, the job description is vaguer for girls, including light house work, cooking, cleaning, running errands and many unpaid hours of conversations before and after sessions with parents. Whereas for boys, the job description is clearer, rarely includes other housework or chores and there are no unpaid conversations or last minute changes. From an early age, girls’ time is valued less and involves more unpaid hours and more out-of-pocket expenses.

World of Part-time Retail: Difficult Customers, Credit Card Debt and Harassment

It is not much different for young girls in retail either. Many are placed in more intensive and customer service oriented positions that are not managerial positions nor positions that they handle money. “You are so good with people” is a common sentiment they hear often. In addition to being asked to deal with challenging customers, the aesthetic demands of retail and service sector jobs is more intense for young women. In order to get and keep retail and service sector jobs, young women are asked to purchase the products that they are selling. This push to look the part results in large amounts of credit card debt. In addition, many report having experienced sexual harassment, racial inequality, but very few report these problems because many say “it is not my real job.”

Part-time Teen Jobs are the Origins of the Gender Wage Gap

These early part-time jobs are especially important because they point to the origins of the gender wage gap. Using NLSY97 dataset, I find that 12 and 13-year-olds make the same amount of money, however, by the time they reach 14 and 15-years of age, we see the emergence of the gender wage gap, which widens with age. Statistical modelling shows that controlling for all background factors, the cost of being a girl remains higher than being a boy when it comes to wages. While some individual characteristics such as race and age exacerbate the wage gap, the important factor in explaining the early wage gap is in the concentration of the girls in freelance jobs (such as babysitting) and the concentration of boys in more employee-type jobs. As soon as employee-type jobs are available, boys move into those jobs, while girls remain in the lower paying freelance jobs. Even within freelance type jobs, girls are placed in different positions, often in customer service and not management or controlling money.

Unintended (Gendered) Consequences of Part-time Work

Many teenagers work part-time while still in school- it has economic benefits, socializes teenagers and has social benefits and teaches young people about discipline. Yet an unintended consequence of these early jobs is it socializes young workers into the gendered expectations and problems of the workforce. While teens are given positive messages at home and at school, these messages have little impact as they experience the problems of the workforce first-hand.


Yasemin Besen-Cassino is a Professor of Sociology at Montclair State University and is currently serving as the Book Review Editor of Gender&Society. Her new book Cost of Being a Girl: Working Teens and the Origins of the Gender Wage Gap just came out from Temple University Press in December 2017.


We Don’t Leave, They Kick Us Out: Women’s Exit from Male-Dominated Occupations

By Marga Torre

We all know that women and men tend to perform different jobs, and also that jobs typically performed by males come with more power and status. Indeed, sex segregation at work is the most relevant factor explaining the sex gap in wages, promotion, and authority. Therefore, accessing male-dominated fields is crucial for women’s economic and social advancement.

According to data provided by the National Bureau of Statistics, in 1970 about 70 percent of women in the US would have had to change jobs in order to be occupationally distributed in the same manner as men. By 1990, this percentage had decreased to 52, but it has remained rather stable since then. How is this possible when more and more women seem to be entering occupations traditionally dominated by men?  The figure below explains why.  As observed, for every 100 women moving from female- to male-dominated settings, 95 women do the opposite, thereby essentially maintaining existing levels of segregation. In other words, women’s increasing ability to “unlock the door” to male occupations has been accompanied by a substantial movement of women out of male-dominated occupations, reproducing the levels of segregation. In 1989 Jerry A. Jacobs labelled this phenomenon the revolving door, and it continues to be significant today.

Women’s occupational movement


Source: Calculated by the author using NLSY79 (1979-2010).

Why, then, do women leave male-dominated occupations—with their higher salaries and status levels—after clearing the barriers to entry? Understanding the flows between male- and female-dominated occupations requires us to examine women’s careers trajectories. Let us imagine two almost identical women starting to work in the same male-dominated occupation. They went to college together and have the same number of years of work experience. The only difference between the two women is that one started her career in the male sector right after college, while the other did so only after a period of employment in female-dominated jobs. Are they both equally likely to succeed in the male-dominated occupation? Despite their similarities, there are reasons to think that there is a higher risk of attrition with the second woman. This, I argue here, is because the notion of women’s work is imbued with assumptions and beliefs about the worth of the worker, which hinders their integration in the male sector. I use the term scar effect to describe the penalties associated with time spent in female-dominated occupations for women’s opportunities in male-dominated occupations.

The figure below uses data compiled between 1979 and 2010 to show the exit probability for women switching from a male- to a female-dominated occupation one year after being hired. We distinguish three type of women with three different career trajectories: women already working in the male field (insiders), women recently arriving from a female-dominated occupation (newcomers), and women who have experienced previous episodes of attrition from male-dominated occupations (repeaters). Blue indicates lower exit rates, while the spectrum closer to red indicates higher exit rates—all after controlling for relevant demographic characteristics (age, level of education, parental and marital status), and work-related features (tenure, hours worked, year of experience).


          Source: Calculated by the author using NLSY79 (1979-2010)

As observed, the probability of moving to a female-dominated occupation one year after entry is significantly lower for women who have been working in the male field than for women who have recently arrived from female settings. More specifically, the probability of attrition to female occupations is 22 percent for insiders but over 40 percent for newcomers in the case of “high-status” professionals. The probability of exit for repeaters is higher still at about 50 percent, almost twice the probability of attrition for insiders. It could be that co-workers perceive previous episodes of attrition from male-dominated occupations as an indication of failure, or of women’s inability to fulfill their responsibilities; such sentiments and lack of confidence in their abilities could raise the probability of such repeaters exiting and returning to a more supportive environment. The differences among women in low-status occupations are less pronounced. Attrition rates range from 30 percent for insiders to about 42 percent for repeaters, with newcomers at around 40 percent. In short, attrition is substantially higher for newcomers than for insiders among both categories of workers, while professionals suffer extra penalties for earlier episodes of attrition.

This evidence points to the scar effect of female work; in other words, women’s attrition can be partly explained by newcomers’ disadvantages with respect to both men and women employed in male-dominated occupations. This effect is more pronounced in the most prestigious occupations. Incumbents in male-dominated occupations tend to penalize women arriving from outside the world of men’s work, whose presence is seen as inappropriate or peculiar, more than women whose career paths have followed men’s all along.


Marga Torre is Assistant Professor in Sociology at University Carlos III of Madrid (Spain). Her research interests include gender, occupational segregation, labor markets, and social media. Her work has recently appeared in Social Forces, Sociological  Perspectives, and International Migration.



Will working class men go into jobs mostly done by women?

By Janette Dill

The election of Donald Trump has brought attention to a group of voters that helped to bring him into office: the working class, and especially working class men. The shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-based economy, referred to as the New Economy, has been a difficult transition for working class men: the percentage of men working in manufacturing and production jobs – jobs that used to be “good jobs” for men without a college degree – has declined by over 50% since the 1970s, and men’s wages have also dropped over the same time period. Working class men’s support for Donald Trump, who has promised a return of the manufacturing economy, shows their frustration with the labor market and their

As male-dominated manufacturing and production jobs have declined, there has been a concurrent rise in demand for many female-dominated occupations, such as nursing assistants, home health aides, and child care workers. However, few working class men are entering these female-dominated occupations, despite high demand for these workers. Why? A recent article in the New York Times explored this issue, asking why men don’t want to do work that is mostly done by women. The article primarily focuses on the masculine identity; men don’t want to do jobs that require doing tasks that are associated with femaleness, such as caring for an elderly person or child. Indeed, the swagger and machismo of Donald Trump promises not only a return of men’s manufacturing jobs, but a return of the working class masculine identity. Continue reading “Will working class men go into jobs mostly done by women?”